Ⅲ ABSTRACT: Th e adoption of the Kyoto Protocol was a major breakthrough in committing industrialized countries to reduce their emissions of greenhouse gases, even if the eff ect is disputed. Th e protocol works through mechanisms that ascribe value to the environment in terms of those emissions-a numerical value based on carbon, which is then translated into a monetary value. Th is article reviews the diff erent understandings of value implicated in debates about the environment seen through carbon. It does this by contrasting the values embedded in some of the various initiatives that have resulted from the Kyoto Protocol, and how they relate to the market, government control, and individual consumer morality, among other things. Controversy over carbon trading is entangled in the capacity of carbon to commensurate a wide range of human and nonhuman actions via their cost in emissions, which nevertheless is countered by moral diff erentiation.
Introduction
It is said that we now live in a new "carbon economy" (Newell et al. 2012: 1) , and carbon is "fast becoming a common denominator for thinking about the organization of social life in relation to the environment" (Bridge 2010: 821) . Carbon has been central to the development of human civilization and state power (Mitchell 2009 ), but with carbon-or, rightly, carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) 1 -as the baseline greenhouse gas deemed to be responsible fo r global warming and climate change, an increasing amount of resources are put into either curbing emissions or somehow reducing their harm. Th is means that carbon is being counted, measured, and subjected to management in all corners of the globe. According to Gavin Bridge, control of the social and natural circulation of carbon is happening through "cartographies" of carbon resources, "ethnographies" of individual carbon consumption, and "a biopolitics" of making clear how carbon is what enables life itself (2010: 821) . Th e new forms of carbon control involve the making of national inventories of carbon (Andersson et al. 2009) , and coming up with innovative technological or social ideas relating to, for instance, carbon capture and storage (e.g., Mills 2011), low or zero carbon energy alternatives (e.g., Helm and Hepburn 2009; Lohmann 2009a) , or ways of governing people that make them emit less through a combination of state regulation and market incentives (e.g., Hepburn 2009) .
In this article I review the debate about the value of carbon as it is represented and discussed in a selection of the scholarly literature about the diff erent initiatives in which carbon is objec-tifi ed and managed. 2 It is an attempt to draw upon especially anthropological theorizations of value in order to review how the value of carbon or values related to carbon are being discussed, and what the complications are. Consequently, I aim to show how value appears both in the sense of price and in the sense of ethics. I also want to show that carbon value depends on the construction of equivalence or commensurability between diff erent emissions, and that the equivalence engenders at the same time processes of diff erentiation equally central to the valuation of carbon.
Th is approach leads me to focus on three arenas in which the value of carbon in relation to the environment is contested. Th e fi rst is the Kyoto Protocol and the carbon markets institutionalizing value as price. Th e second is the value of carbon as it has entered public discourses about the climate-concerned individual or corporation (value as norms or ethics). Th e third is how carbon enters into the international relationship between the global North and the global South as an object of contestation interpreted as either development aid or neocolonialism (again, value as norms or ethics). Th e valuations in these three arenas are closely interrelated, but for the sake of clarity I try to keep them apart. Toward the end, I return to the way carbon is embedded in controversies of value through a tension between equivalence and diff erentiation.
Approaching Carbon Value
Carbon clearly speaks to diff erent understandings of value, which may clash or conversely reinforce each other in the struggle over the carbon-based responses to climate change. As mentioned, one is in the economic sense of price, which is most clearly captured in the making of markets. Another is in the sociological sense of norm, ethics, or morality. Th ird, carbon is also valued in the cultural sense of meaning ascribed, for instance, to the environment or nature. Th is tripartite division of value as price, norm, and meaning is roughly inspired by way the anthropologist David Graeber (2001) argued that the term "value" has been used in three diff erent ways in anthropology. Graeber's own approach, inspired by, among others, Karl Marx and the anthropologists Terence Turner and Nancy Munn, focuses on value as generated in action. I will return briefl y to this perspective below.
Th e economic sense of value is most clearly evident in the background assumptions for market-based approaches to climate change mitigation. Since carbon is said to have the same global impact on the atmosphere no matter where it is emitted and who does the emitting, it is claimed that it also does not matter where carbon is "saved" and by whom (e.g., Yamin 2005b: xxix). Carbon thus has the same "climate impact value" globally. Th is aspect is a key component behind the commodifi cation of carbon. Commodifi cation of carbon into quantifi ed and tradable allowances itself reinforces the fungibility of carbon, and how it becomes a generic commoditized object that can be exchanged for any other (e.g., MacKenzie 2009; Lohmann 2010). In addition, carbon allowances have, like certain other commodities, been noted to exhibit characteristics of derivatives (e.g., Lohmann 2010) and of currencies (Deschenau 2012; Dalsgaard 2013) , and have been argued to be capable of breaking down boundaries between spheres of exchange (Dalsgaard 2013) . One critical note on the economic and quantifi able understanding of value is how carbon's value nonetheless becomes debated and fl uctuates once it is subjected to trade between diff erent locales-also in moral or ethical value and in cultural value.
Economic theories may claim that the rational, maximizing individual is a universal given, and that price is the most objective (albeit fl uid) measure that could encompass other forms of value, but a counterargument would be that the "economic" is as much about the ascription of meaning as anything else, and that assumptions about market logic are ideological and depend on values in the sense of norms about what to include and exclude (e.g., Newell 2012: 137) . Change in economic value derives from or implies changes in meaning-for instance, when commodities enter into new social contexts or relationships along a value chain, where they get sorted and thus reevaluated in each new place both in terms of what they cost and what they mean to people (cf. Tsing 2005: 51) . Carbon in its many diff erent forms (from fossil fuels to emission allowances on paper) similarly "travels" in multiple ways, and carries diff erent potentials for valuation. Th is is similar to how brands gain value depending on diff erent sources of ascriptions of meaning-both material and symbolic (cf. Foster 2008) .
Th e most controversial aspect of measuring carbon emissions is that it allows the potential comparison, if not outright commensuration, of everything humans do, wherever they do it, and oft en even whenever they do it (see MacKenzie 2009; Dalsgaard 2013; Lovell 2014) . First, this enables the valuation of nature and natural resources in a single mode of quantifi cation (amounts of carbon "units"). Second, in addition to reordering the value of nature, the carbon atom, because it is omnipresent, may also form the basis for a moral comparison of virtually all human actions through their impacts on the climate across time and space. Paraphrasing Michael Lambek writing about value, carbon is thus both substance and relation, and " [i] t brings together what in Western thought has been distinguished as the material and the ideal" (2013: 142) . Th e commensuration is, of course, itself a scientifi c and economic ideal, and the claim to commensuration by any standard "is noted most when it creates relations among things that seem fundamentally diff erent" (Espeland and Stevens 1998: 332) .
Th e literature about carbon draws upon diff erent and sometimes intertwined understandings of value along the lines of the tripartite classifi cation mentioned previously. Th e institution of markets, the quantifi cation of atoms based on scientifi c constructs, or the normative incentive to "save the environment" or be a "good citizen" all play a role. Matthew Paterson and Johannes Stripple (2012) have in this regard experimented with the term "virtuous carbon" to capture the governmental process of both the virtuality of the carbon credit and the virtues and self-evident moral quality that the commodities are imbued with. Th eir concern matches Lambek's (2013: 143) discussion of the relationship between values in the market as being commensurable and values as ethics as fundamentally incommensurable (see also Rival 2010) . Especially for carbon, a large amount of the literature that deals with its value expresses concerns over carbon's capacity to commensurate (e.g., MacKenzie 2009; Lohmann 2010; Dalsgaard 2013) , while otherswithout necessarily neglecting the commensurability-are more focused on the way carbon value becomes culturally diff erentiated to target individual consumers (e.g., Lovell et al. 2009) .
Th is opposition of commensurable and incommensurable invites us to consider how valuing carbon also depends on the identifi cation of "meaningful diff erence"-that things are valuable with reference to their position in a structure and relationally to what they are not (see Graeber 2001: 13-20) . Concerns with commensurability and incommensurability relate to what is regarded as diff erence or sameness. "Meaningful diff erence" is about the struggle over which meanings are ascribed to carbon as a measure of climate change, as a fi nancial commodity, as a building block for life, or in whatever other forms carbon may appear. It is thus also about how value is generated through commensurating or, conversely, distinguishing between different actions or objects despite their apparent equivalence in climatic eff ects. Th e construct, which "performs" the task of commensuration, is called carbon dioxide equivalent (CO 2 e). It is a scientifi c construct that compares the climate impact of six major greenhouse gases. 3 First, all actions appear "the same", when counted in this measure of carbon's climate costs (MacKenzie 2009), but markers of diff erentiation are also employed to distinguish ethically and normatively between "good" carbon and "bad" carbon, which again aff ects its market price. CO 2 e units are thus not really equivalent in value except in terms of their eff ect on the climate. Both Graeber and Lambek approach value from the perspective of "action", and here especially Lambek's distinction between "doing" and "making" is interesting in understanding how to value is an action, but also how actions and their eff ects come to be valuable. Seeing nature and the environment through the lens of carbon, which makes both nature and human action quantifi able and accountable in terms of climate impact, refl ects back on the value of those same human actions in the market. Even not doing anything (about greenhouse gas emissions, for instance) has gained a price aft er carbon has become a commodity, which one can trade as an off set for what other people do in terms of emissions. Carbon commodifi cation thus potentially questions any emphasis on "work" and "labor" as that which generates value (see Smith 2007) .
Th e Kyoto Protocol and the Institutionalization of Carbon Markets
Carbon emissions used to be an externality in economic terms. Th ey were a cost, which were put upon actors outside the market. Th e problem with this understanding was most forcefully formulated in the Stern Review, which stated that it would be economically cheaper to spend money on the mitigation of climate change now than it would be to bear the costs later (Stern 2006 ). Yet, the foundation for the inclusion of carbon in the economy came much earlier. As a reaction to climate change, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was founded in 1992, and it was the entity behind the signing of the Kyoto Protocol in 1997.
Th e protocol came into eff ect in 2005. In the protocol, the so-called Annex 1 countries (the 37 signatories that are industrialized countries and members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD] , including some that are "economies in transition") agreed to reduce the emissions of six specifi c greenhouse gases an average of 5.2 percent below the 1990 levels of emission. To do this the protocol set up three so-called fl exible mechanisms to govern the trade in emission rights of the gases in question (see UNFCCC 1998).
• Th e Joint Implementation mechanism involves setting up projects that will reduce emissions in other countries. Th us, Annex 1 countries can earn "emission reduction units" from an emission reduction or emission removal project in another country.
• Th e Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) sets up the possibility for Annex 1 countries to purchase carbon credits in developing countries, again via projects. Developing countries have no restrictions on emissions, but through selling carbon credits, it is argued that they will have incentives to turn toward "green" and carbon-free energy or emission reduction projects, which will earn them "certifi ed emission reductions". • Whereas the former two are project-based forms of emission reduction, the protocol also allows for emissions trading, or, in other words, a cap-and-trade market for carbon. Governments put a cap or limit on what each industrial actor is allowed to emit, measured in "carbon credits" or "carbon permits" (with one credit set as the emission of one ton of CO 2 e). Th ose companies that exceed their limit may purchase additional allowances from those who do not meet their limits and have some to spare.
Th e Kyoto Protocol thus entails several diff erent forms of carbon trading, with diff erent price mechanisms and diff erent units being traded. Emission reduction units, certifi ed emission reductions, and so on all sound similar, as does "allowance", "permit", and "credit", and ideally they are all counted in the same way (a reduction of one ton of CO 2 e). However, many diff erent factors, from details of the countries involved in generating the emission right to the types of reductions covered and the anticipation of how "clean" the emission allowance in question is, aff ect both the risk involved and hence also the price and value of the carbon traded (Grubb 2003: 175-177) . Emission rights, whether as credits or permits, thus come in diff erent forms and are made in diff erent ways. Th e basic logic behind them, though, remains the same: one action can be off set either by an equivalent reduction (such as an equivalent nonaction) or an equivalent removal, and in that sense, a cheap off set is just as valuable in climate terms as an expensive one (Spash 2010: 185) . Th e protocol refers to compliance markets set up by the signing governments, where permits or credits are given (or auctioned) to those that depend on the emission of various greenhouse gases (typically the transport or energy sectors, or industrial production). Th ese actors then have the option of selling or trading excess permits, and those in need of more space within the cap can either invest in emission-reducing technology or purchase more credits from actors that have some to spare. Th ese actors can sell their extra permits to someone, who might need to exceed the cap or will profi t from exceeding it. Th e idea is that exceeding it without the permit will be more costly than it will be to purchase a permit from others, and that savings or reductions in carbon emissions will then take place where it will be cheapest to cut back. Th us, the idea is that extra or sellable credits can be "produced" by storing or saving carbon where it is most cost-effi cient, and that the excess credits can be sold to industries, which then do not have to reduce production in order to stay within a cap (see Lohmann 2010) .
Th e European Union (EU) has been on the forefront of making a compliance market with an emission trading system (ETS). Th is quota system provides a political and institutional framework that ideally should enable reductions if the cap is gradually reduced (European Commission 2013). Because of the EU ETS, some fi nancial traders expected that "[c]arbon will be the world's biggest commodity market, and it could become the world's biggest market overall" (Kanter 2007 ). Yet, the EU was initially overly generous in handing out permits to industry. Th is drove down the price to the extent that it almost has undermined the market itself (see Lohmann 2008) . In early 2013 the price of carbon permits on the EU ETS market was so low that the market was referred to as almost "meaningless" (Stonington 2013) , and even a recent postponing of the auctioning of extra credits has probably merely stabilized the price (Carrington 2013). In terms of reducing emissions, the amounts of CO 2 emitted actually increased within the EU in the fi rst couple of years aft er introducing the ETS (Spash 2010: 171) . Subsequent reductions in emissions were possibly caused by the downturn in economic activity following the great fi nancial crisis (World Bank 2013: 10) . Proponents have defended the ETS, though, by stating that it is a "prototype" (Markandya 2009 (Markandya : 1149 , and that such institutions take time before they eventually work (Depledge and Yamin 2009 ). Nothing like it has been attempted at this scale before, so carbon markets have been referred to as an ongoing "in vivo" market experiment (Callon 2009) .
Th e establishment of carbon as a commodity is further complicated by voluntary markets, where corporations and consumers are allowed to engage in voluntary carbon trading, which is less strictly governed and allows for more fl exibility in what "units" can be traded (e.g., Lovell and Liverman 2010: 258; Bumpus and Liverman 2011: 216) . Some countries have abandoned the Kyoto Protocol, but other markets are increasingly appearing within smaller jurisdictions of regions that have given up waiting for national or global agreements. In the United States, for example, carbon was until 2010 traded on the Chicago Climate Exchange (CCX) as a voluntary market, 4 and a new market for carbon was established in 2012 by the State of California. Th e eff ects of the Kyoto Protocol are today disputed. Th e United States failed to ratify the protocol, while other major carbon-emitting countries were not committed to binding reduction targets (most notably China). Another major emitter (Canada) announced its withdrawal in 2011. Th e EU introduced its emissions trading scheme soon aft er the adoption of the protocol, but the scheme has been heavily criticized, as mentioned previously. Th e faith in a market-based solution to climate change did suff er setbacks aft er the great fi nancial crisis and due to the problems with the ETS, but there are still a lot of political and economic interests vested in carbon markets (cf. Paterson 2012) , and an increase in optimism has been presented in some fi nancial circles (see Peters-Stanley and Yin 2013) .
Th e critique of the Kyoto Protocol in relation to environmental value has mainly come from scholarly and activist circles. Seeing the environment through the perspective of carbon, the argument is not merely that climate change is a "market failure" (Stern 2006) , or that almost everything nature "does" is presented as being some kind of ecosystem service (Lohmann 2009b) , but that the global fl ow of carbon can be a tool for neoliberal economists to introduce even more global capital fl ows (e.g., Lohmann 2010), or that nature is almost seen as governed by the same qualities or logics as the market (cf. Szerszynski and Urry 2010). In particular, the relationship between risk and profi t has been transferred onto this valuation of the environment (Lohmann 2010 ).
Yet critics are also divided. Some are open to market experiments or see it as a move toward a new, greener "climate capitalism" (Newell and Paterson 2009 ), while others have argued that the invisible hand of the market is unlikely to "adjust the natural thermostat" unless capitalism's institutions are radically reformed (Storm 2009 ). Others argue that since the market is based on constant expansion yet is located in a limited world, a "green" market solution is a contradiction in terms (McMichael 2009 ) and serves new modes of capital accumulation (Böhm et al. 2012) .
Presenting the institutional background to the making of carbon markets, I have for now glossed over the perspectives that stress the social production of the entities involved, and how other understandings of value in relation to the environment appear as a consequence. But it is quite relevant to how some carbon markets have generated initiatives that individualize responsibility for climate change as private and voluntary choice, speaking to social norms and ethics.
Carbon as Moral Choice
Climate science may not have persuaded governments or emission-heavy industries to do enough about curbing emissions, but climate science certainly has aff ected the sociocultural context in which Western consumers live their lives, and some observers comment that "[p]olitically correct (PC) behavior has given way to climate correct (CC) actions" (Boykoff et al. 2009 (Boykoff et al. : 2301 . Global economic and climatic options and values are domesticated as private choice, and the individual-not society, the state, or the nation-has to a large extent come to bear the burden through the "carbon footprint", which like a brand transcends diff erent sources of value-from market to "sentiment" (see Foster 2008) . "Low carbon", "carbon neutral", or even "carbon positive" products are used as ploys of marketing on the one hand, but they are also increasingly becoming personal sources of identifi cation to individuals on the other hand, even if these may still only be a small proportion of the total number of consumers (cf. Paterson and Stripple 2010) .
A recent study of Swedish students has shown that the choice of purchasing personal carbon allowances depends both on price and the presence of social norms (Lindman et al. 2013) . While a very small minority choose to opt out and not take part in the capitalist economy at all, the majority of those concerned citizens, who choose to act, engage in the purchase of organically grown foods, the replanting of vegetation, or simply the off set of one's private consumption. For these people there are companies that off er ready-made packages of carbon off sets to match international fl ights, car transport, festive events (e.g., one's wedding), and pretty much everything else a consumer can think of (see Lovell et al. 2009) . Th e empirical examples of nudging the consumers are legion. In Denmark, bus and train companies advertise by stating how much CO 2 one saves by using public transport, and one advertisement campaign even referred to the passengers as "world saviors" (Dalsgaard 2013) . Companies in the aviation industry may also off er to off set the carbon footprint of fl ights for you. Th e airline SAS thus explains on its Danish-language website how voluntary off setting is not indulgence payments nor a matter of "bad conscience", but a real way to pay for reducing emissions through the development of clean technology (Scandinavian Airlines 2013).
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Th e comparison to indulgence payments is one that was leveled at off set systems already in the 1990s and possibly even earlier (see . By paying others to curb their emissions, consumers are allowed to continue living (in luxury) as before, but can simultaneously feel good about having done something to atone for their sins, whether these are avoidable or not. 6 Yet, denial of the comparison is crucial for industry to pass on the costs to the individual consumer. Conversely, some private companies do what they can to inform both government and the general public that they do pay off sets as a part of their corporate social responsibility (CSR), and they may actively market themselves in terms of what they do about climate change (Boykoff et al. 2009 (Boykoff et al. : 2301 .
CSR and demonstrating "climate leadership" were mentioned in a report on the state of the voluntary carbon markets as the two most conveyed motivations for companies in voluntarily off setting emissions (Peters-Stanley and Yin 2013: viii), but there are other considerations behind such statements, too. A common one is "precompliance", which is to anticipate national legislation on caps (Peters-Stanley and Yin 2013: xiv). Th e lure of carbon fi nance has been noted as motivating actors to restructure industries and livelihoods to position themselves for future economic gain (Yamane 2009 ). Private companies do not lack invitations to do so. Business and marketing publishers have begun to turn out books that tell you how to make your business ready for the coming carbon economy, whether it involves being able to make a profi t from the switch to "a low-carbon world" (Jolly 2010) , or simply how to be more "effi cient, sustainable and competitive" (Tamminen and Schwarzenegger 2011) .
Proponents of voluntary carbon trading have stressed how private corporations are indeed taking on the responsibility of the state (Peters-Stanley and Yin 2013), and some scholars emphasize the moral value of voluntary markets being bottom-up rather than top-down like the compliance markets (Lovell and Liverman 2010: 265) . Th e trade in CDM credits involves "devolving" governance to a mix of supranational bodies, nonstate agents, and market forces in order to keep up with the requirements (Bumpus and Liverman 2009), and smaller regional markets are appearing to counter the lack of coherent national and international policy (Benson 2010 ), but there is also a shift from public to private knowledge in how to deal with political and environmental problems (Boykoff et al. 2009 (Boykoff et al. : 2303 . Simultaneously, civil society actors have increasingly been "enjoined to take on a regulatory role outside the state apparatus through the moralization of certain commodity markets" (Castree 2010: 22) .
In the UK, suggestions of personal carbon allowances to either households or individuals have attracted attention, but no government has had the determination to implement this (see Fawcett and Parag 2010) . Such personal allowances would individualize environmental responsibility as quota to an unprecedented extent, but even without it, the objectifi cation of carbon as valuable in the market is already said to inform the way private economic choices become domesticated and appear in the everyday life of the Western consumer.
Th e ensuing "subject positions" are certainly not universal, nor even mainstream in Western countries, but recent research has nonetheless focused on the way carbon objectifi cation may change how climate-concerned Westerners travel, what food they eat, how they wash their clothes, the temperature they allow themselves to have indoors, what objects they throw away (or not), how they carry their groceries, and so forth (e.g., Paterson and Stripple 2010; Lindman et al. 2013) . Th e contemporary carbon economy is thus said to ideally give rise to calculative spaces for the individual consumer (Bridge 2010) .
Recent studies have stressed how the carbon economy, by individualizing the responsibility for climate change as "common sense" (Rutland and Aylett 2008) and scaling it onto the household, is a neoliberal form of governance (Paterson and Stripple 2010) . To do this, the carbon economy also relies on a communicative rationality of social networking (peer pressure, etc.), even when it is an indulgence-like "vanity-oriented virtue politics" (Paterson and Stripple 2010; see also Bridge 2010: 828) . Purchasing individual off sets is a new form of consumption practice, but one that is symbolic and does not have an obvious material component. Social networking is important precisely for that reason, and so is the marketing voiced in ethical and sometimes romanticized narratives of the good that off sets do-even if it misrepresents the carbon creditproducing realities typically located in the global South (Lovell et al. 2009 ; see also Hoefl e 2013). A project about heat-effi cient cookstoves in the global South, for example, is presented as saving lives (by reducing smoke in kitchens) and empowering women. It is thus wrapped in narratives of doing much more than merely reducing carbon emissions (Global Alliance for Clean Cookstoves 2014).
It is through stories about particular carbon off set projects that these products have meaning and value. It is through images, brochures, website devices, and off set packaged products that the consumption of off sets is made easy and habitual for consumers. Th e off set narratives and technologies also act to reassure consumers about what it is they are buying, given the absence of both a tangible product and regulatory standards. (Lovell et al. 2009 (Lovell et al. : 2358 Similarly, Ehrenstein and Muniesa writing about a Congolese reforestation project tells the reader how "the quality of the [credit-producing] project is also its ability to please the fi nal user of the carbon credits, " for example through "the touching narrative it is embedded in" (2013: 179). In this case it is the story of a project that helps stabilize both biodiversity and diffi cult socioeconomic conditions in a country emerging from war.
Carbon thus works as a tool to convert or translate value from widely diff erent settings across time and space into the domestic sphere as a social and moral pointer to how one should live one's life. Th e value of carbon has thus been noted to refer both to its price and to the moralization of individual consumption akin to branding, fair trade, and similar forms of valuations of special products (see Lovell et al. 2009 Lovell et al. : 2358 Ehrenstein and Muniesa 2013: 179) . Th e symbolic translation of the valuations of carbon from, for instance, material reforestation in the global South via commodifi cation in the form of carbon credits to the counting and moralization of emissions in the West is an arduous process, one that contrasts diff erent understandings of value.
Carbon in International Development
As an arena of value generation, carbon markets are deeply implicated in existing discourses about globalization, capitalism, and development. Th e objectifi cation of carbon may not change the international relationships between diff erent countries as such, but it does accentuate a distinction in particular between the global North (Annex 1 countries under the Kyoto Protocol) and the global South (non-Annex 1 countries). Th e non-Annex 1 countries are exempt from caps on emissions despite high economic growth in some countries, such as India and Brazil. Th e argument is based on the observation that climate change hits unevenly. Climate change has a large eff ect on the poor and those in the global South, who do not have the resources to adapt to environmental changes (e.g., McMichael 2009).
Despite diff erentiation between Annex 1 and non-Annex 1 countries, trying to regulate climate change indirectly via the fi nance market is said to reward those having caused the problem through excessive consumption and emissions, since they can make money on fi nancial carbon speculation. Th e global North accounted a few years back for 80 percent of CO 2 buildup in the atmosphere (McMichael 2009: 248 ). Yet, the World Bank and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) still focus a lot of eff ort on cutting down emissions from deforestation done by people in developing countries, who only account for 20-25 percent of the problem. Th e rationale is again one deriving from the market-that it is cheaper for the poor to transform their energy use (McMichael 2009: 250-251) , and they can do so through technology transfer from the global North (e.g., Ockwell and Mallett 2012). Responses to climate change have in this fi eld become bundled into an existing discourse on development synonymous with market capitalism (McMichael 2009) . Th is means that responses to climate change are framed through market initiatives such as carbon trading and emission off sets, which commoditizes the ecological commons in developing countries.
One of the programs through which the CDM mechanism but also the voluntary markets have been working is REDD (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation), today called REDD+. 7 REDD is supposed to channel funding from Western donors to forestowning communities in the global South in order to aid with aff orestation and reforestation. Established under the UN (see un-redd.org), the fi rst years of REDD have seen pilot projects and the conducting of "readiness" activities, including capacity building, policy design, and other actions that must be taken prior to implementation (see Angelsen et al. 2012) . Th ese activities have oft en been funded via the World Bank in order to provide poor people with the capacity to participate in emerging markets (Leach and Leach 2004) . However, with the recent agreement at the UN Climate Change Conference (COP19/CMP9) in Warsaw, more details were approved such as monitoring systems, emission levels, and coordination of funding (Twidale 2013) .
As with the Kyoto Protocol, critics remain skeptical of the value of REDD. It is not clear whether such a program is attractive enough for local entrepreneurs and forest owners to choose conservation over, for instance, establishing plantations (Butler et al. 2009 ), or to accept compensation for avoided emissions over royalties from mining or fossil fuel extraction (see Rival 2010) . Th ere can be multiple outstanding issues in terms of access to land and distribution of benefi ts "on the ground" (e.g., Leggett and Lovell 2012) . What is recognized as forest tenure varies widely, and trees are used for many diff erent purposes (e.g., Leach and Leach 2004: 78) , so establishing global programs that will be perceived as fair across diff erent regions and contexts is diffi cult. It can also be problematic when carbon stocks become commodities while other noncommoditized elements of the local ecosystem are ignored and biodiversity thus endangered by one-sided valuation strategies (Bumpus and Liverman 2011: 218) .
However, there are many diff erent actors involved in REDD, and the fl exibility of the common denominator of carbon still enables it to serve several diff erent interests-political, economic, conservationist, and so on (cf. Paterson 2012) . REDD and carbon may be a way for conservation nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to protect virgin forests, but it also allows them to raise revenue to sustain their own work. Other organizations such as the World Bank and the UNDP promote REDD in the hope that it will help reduce poverty, but it is also convenient for a political agenda of controlling the emerging carbon markets. Meanwhile, business investors or local or national elites in developing countries see REDD as an opportunity for land reforms that will help them access land to develop industry or plantations.
Activists, on the other hand, have generally feared that REDD would allow greenwashing of the extractive industries and thus legitimize expansion of their activities while at the same time potentially dispossessing indigenous people of their customary land (Cabello and Gilbertson 2011) . According to activist blogs critically documenting REDD and carbon trading, land grabs are occurring as indigenous people and other rural forest owners are pressured to sign away their land rights (Marotta and Coute-Marotta 2012 ). Yet, indigenous people and historic forest owners fall neatly into the category of the stereotypical poor forest owner, which the REDD program addresses, while, for instance, those migrating in order to escape environmental degradation elsewhere are forgotten or even blamed for the unsustainable clearing of forests in frontier regions, where they are forced to settle and make a living (Hoefl e 2013) .
Anthropologists, geographers, and development scholars have taken up REDD and attempted to discuss the social, political, and economic consequences entailed by the diversity of interests in REDD. Th e reports stating problems have been legion. Th ey range from criticisms of the assumptions behind processes of deforestation (Hoefl e 2013), via proposals to use REDD funding to establish oil palm plantations (Creagh 2010) , to analysis of the political eff ects of rumors about carbon trading when it is hijacked by con artists and never materializes (e.g., Filer 2012). Stakeholders in both government and local NGOs express uncertainty about REDD, even if they see it as involving a potential for forest governance (see Filer 2012; Mulyani and Jepson 2013) . Stronger forest governance is exactly what some fear will result from carbon trading (Filer and Wood 2012) , and, for instance, in Papua New Guinea the REDD program has become incorporated into the current forest management regime, which is deeply embroiled in logging interests (Filer 2012) . REDD is only one of the initiatives trying to exchange Western emissions for global South off sets. Heat-effi cient cookstoves, windmills, and even manual treadle pumps to replace diesel-driven ones have been implemented as projects. Especially the latter has been seen as the preservation of luxury lifestyles (Western emissions) over subsistence work (Blok 2011: 467) . When postindustrial countries compensate for their own high emissions and pay for nature conservation in developing countries, they potentially introduce not only infrastructure, but also impose technologies that aff ect what counts as an important resource (high carbon stocks), as well as how people in the global South can act as subjects and citizens. Hence, trade in off sets has been criticized as being a new form of (carbon) colonialism, which continues dominance of North over South. Even national sovereignty could become challenged if carbon trading brings disputes about who actually owns the protected carbon resources (Bumpus and Liverman 2011: 218) .
To be sure, the commodifi cation of carbon has generated an international debate on value, with strong positions for and against the existing programs and their alternatives. Some are overly positive and trust technology and fi nance to be value-neutral mechanisms merely generating income and opportunities, while others see them as technologies or techniques for governmentality (Lovell and Liverman 2010) . No one disagrees, though, that the control of carbon is crucial in order to mitigate climate change, and that in this sense carbon is valuable. Yet the meanings that are to be ascribed not only to carbon and its changing contexts, but also to the changes and positions generated by the pricing of carbon, in turn creates debate. Th is is why I want to fi nally turn to the way capacities and processes of commensuration and diff erentiation are part of making carbon valuable in order to clarify how meaning is erased or reattributed.
Making Value through Equivalence and Diff erentiation
First, I will return to how the eff ectiveness of the market-based form of carbon management depends on a simple scientifi c assumption of equivalence: that no matter where carbon is emit-ted, and whatever action it is that does the emitting, it has the same impact on the atmosphere once a baseline has been established. Since climate change knows no boundaries, neither do mitigating activities, and carbon can be saved or emitted anywhere on earth to have the same impact. Carbon trading thus contains an inherent reductionism by enabling vastly diff erent entities to be evaluated by the same standard (Bridge 2010: 822) .
Still, establishing a basis for equivalence and commensurability through the market requires delimitation of the object in time and space, so that it can be abstracted from "place, technology, history and gas type" (Lohmann 2010: 237) . Th e basic unit for this is the CO 2 e, but the existence of the CO 2 e and its inclusion in the market sphere presupposes a demand for detailed forms of accounting and measurement (see Lippert 2013; Lovell 2014) . Th is partly works to identify carbon and keep track of it, and partly converts carbon into other forms of value.
Carbon may have an inherent capacity to be measured and quantifi ed, but actually doing it demands clear defi nitions as well as large apparatuses of mapping, certifi cation, and monitoring. Th is requires widely diff erent disciplines in the natural and social sciences to understand each other and work together to defi ne when and where comparable amounts of carbon have been emitted. Th e impacts and thus the equivalences assumed by the off set logic are nonetheless both technically and scientifi cally diffi cult to determine, and they depend on rough estimates, unknowns, and "unknown unknowns" in relation to scale, speed, and severity of climate change (Szerszynski and Urry 2010: 2) .
Th e trade in carbon allowances is for this reason fraught with uncertainty-not just uncertainty over market price, which depends on assessments of the state of the climate, regulation, demand, and so forth, but uncertainty over what the commodity is in the fi rst place (see Lohmann 2010 ). Yet, it is exactly uncertainty that students of commodifi cation have argued to be the exploitable material that provides an opportunity for profi t, since "futures … can be operationalized through the calculation and insurance of risk" (Szerszynski and Urry 2010: 1-2) . It thus borders on value being produced out of "thin air", in both a literal and a metaphorical sense (cf. Gutiérrez 2012) .
Th e challenges referred to with regard to the uncertainties surrounding carbon allowances are oft en defi ned in a specifi c lingo and utilize terms such as "leakage" (failure to delimit emissions within a given territory), "permanence" (how long emission reductions will last), or "additionality" (that reductions would not have taken place without the carbon off setting project; in other words, speculation about counterfactual actions and intent). In order to avoid these challenges, it is necessary to have determined the baseline emission. Th e latter is crucial in creating (market) value, since it is what the value is measured against, whether as a history of past emissions if such data exist, or a hypothetical counterfactual scenario of future emissions (see Michaelowa 2005; Ehrenstein and Muniesa 2013) .
Th ere are multiple baselines. For the Kyoto Protocol, 1990 was the global baseline, but for each local off setting project, one needs to determine a specifi c baseline to assess its contribution to reducing emissions. Yet baselines are oft en diffi cult if not impossible to construct due to lack of data, disputed assumptions about "original" vegetation, or because elements such as forest activities are ongoing practices of interaction in and with a landscape (Leach and Leach 2004: 81) . Carbon calculations have thus been open to manipulation depending on politically defi ned best-or worst-case scenarios. Th e calculations also involve the problem of distinguishing the human from the nonhuman when it comes to agency in carbon absorption versus emission (cf. Grubb 2003: 146) . Is, for instance, a bushfi re human-made? It may or may not be lit by human actors, but even if triggered by lightning and thus "natural", it may be exacerbated by changes to local ecology (e.g., reforestation) or prevented with dikes, ditches, or fi rewalls (see Gutiérrez 2013: 51) .
When overcoming all these obstacles to construct the carbon unit and its commensurability, it is obvious that once constructed, a corresponding demand for diff erentiation appears based on all those units that do not live up to the demands or do so in "corrupt" ways. One of the criticisms of carbon trading that is heard the most is that it leads to several forms of "perverse incentives", not least via counterfactuals and baselines. Perverse incentives refer to how polluters can manipulate diff erent aspects of the market to both gain a profi t and possibly even carry on polluting, since there is little incentive to change to more sustainable forms of production (Wara and Victor 2008) . For instance, a favorable "business as usual" baseline will give higher allowances and thus more credits to sell (Lohmann 2009b) , but the original distribution of baselines stemming from the Kyoto Protocol was already accused of being fraught with problems, since some countries, in order to be persuaded to join the protocol, were given excess allowances based on boosted carbon reserves (Spash 2010: 179) .
Apart from challenges with determining exactly when a specifi c amount of carbon is emitted and by whom, it is worth noting the local and idiosyncratic meanings ascribed to human action by diff erent human actors, and how the forms of accounting for carbon may infl uence such cultural perceptions. In this perspective of cultural values, things are, to paraphrase Donald MacKenzie (2009), "not the same", despite the technocratic work of calculation, measurement, and audit that may make them appear so. Even if what matters is the eff ect of greenhouse gases on the atmosphere, the emission or nonemission of such gases is located in various forms of activities and materialities that are imbued with meaning both culturally and socially. In theory it should not matter whether carbon is sequestered in oil palm plantations or virgin rain forest, but it does matter to conservation NGOs, and it also matters to local entrepreneurs trying to make money off the land and off the international funding schemes persuading them to sequester carbon.
Many potential carbon credits are seen as problematic or even fraudulent. Much of the work behind the establishment of carbon markets is done to ensure not only that the saving of carbon is "real, measurable and additional" (Hepburn 2007: 381) , but also that it appears "proper" and can be sold in an almost customized form to Western consumers demanding specifi c ethical narratives, as discussed previously (Lovell et al. 2009 ). While governments have generally failed to set up mechanisms that eff ectively curb emissions (just take the latest UN Climate Change Conference in Warsaw as an example), NGOs and private sector corporations have jumped to fi ll the gap by making the necessary diff erentiations and niches of value that turn specifi c carbon allowances into attractive and distinct "brands" rather than merely uniform commodities. Th e WWF, for instance, has founded the Gold Standard based on the both voluntary and CDM credits, while the other major verifi cation standard, Verifi ed Carbon Standard (VCS), audits and certifi es emission reductions from voluntary off set projects (Lovell and Liverman 2010: 260) . Th ese are ways of trying to make sure that everything is not or at least does not appear the same, despite what the commodity chain does in terms of alienating consumers from the importance of context-that is, how emission reductions are produced (Lohmann 2009a: 361) .
In short, the diff erent valuations of carbon depend upon a balance between the making of equivalence and of diff erentiation. Th ere is a tension in the social science literature about carbon in terms of how equivalence between emissions and thus carbon allowances is seen largely as promising (e.g., Yamin 2005a) or as problematic (e.g., Lohmann 2010) . Even the initiatives that seek to rectify the commensuration and take diff erential cultural and ethical values into account are themselves subject to commodifi cation like brands, which depend upon norms and thus also (meaningful) diff erences for their fi nancial value. It should thus be clear how several diff erent registers of value are at stake in making carbon valuable.
Conclusion
Since the Kyoto Protocol, carbon has become an important object in facilitating humankind's valuation of nature, the environment, and especially the climate. Th e complicity of market forces and state regulation has created commodifi ed emission allowances with a price measured in carbon, but since carbon is everywhere, it can refer to many diff erent things depending on context. While the commensurability of emissions through carbon allows for their global exchange, the very possibility of equivalence has engendered diff erential moral and cultural valuations in response to carbon trading.
Perhaps not surprisingly, carbon trading has been criticized for erasing all forms of value other than the economic, even though it has also been argued to generate moral identifi cations in the form of carbon-calculating subjectivities concerned with "footprints" and voluntary off sets. Th e uncertainties and challenges with carbon trading are manifold, but pointing out all the problems with the Kyoto Protocol, REDD, and so forth can sometimes appear like a shrill critique given the complexities at stake. Carbon trading serves multiple purposes. Some of these are undoubtedly counterproductive to the mitigation of climate change, the preservation of biodiversity, or equal opportunities for income or development. Yet, a better solution that is also realistic is hard to see.
As it is, more research is needed to understand how carbon connects or breaks down various social spheres and boundaries and how it is valued and generates value. Only if we manage to integrate the knowledge forms of the multiple disciplines that are concerned with an understanding of the diff erent values of carbon can there be hope to account for the complexities generated by carbon as a measure. Ⅲ NOTES 1. In this article I will mostly refer to carbon rather than CO 2 or the commensurate construct "CO 2 equivalent", since carbon is the term that is most oft en used in debates about markets, off sets, footprints, and so forth.
